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Seeing Zombie off – Axiologically – Nomologically1 
 
Answer to Vittorio Hösle's Replica2 
 
Abstract: The zombie, mocking all nomological arguments, gives rise to axiological considerations that also 
result in a vindication of the nomological paradigm. So the ‘philosophical benefit of zombies’ ultimately 
proves to be that they lead to an understanding they were originally invented to refute. 
 
(1) Clarification regarding 'selfness' and 'subjectivity': I start with the less weighty monita of the 
criticism formulated by Vittorio Hösle (who, by the way, omits my detailed Chalmers criticism). 
First of all, a clarification regarding my use of the terms 'selfness' and 'subjectivity' of the organism: 
Hösle sees here "two concepts of selfness strictly to be distinguished": "self in the sense of a beha-
viour oriented towards self-preservation and self in the sense of subjectivity", i.e. with "a mental life 
accompanying it" (Hösle's replica). For Hösle, 'subjectivity' is thus always connoted with 'mentali-
ty'. On the other hand, I use 'subjectivity' in the sense of a general characteristic of self-preservating 
beings, so that "organisms, even at the lowest levels of organization" are characterized as "subjects" 
(Wandschneider 2018, 252 f.). With regard to their mental equipment this means that they can have 
mentality, but do not have to have it (according to higher or more primitive developmental stages). 
Of course this is not mainly a question of language usage, but obviously the different terminology 
has given rise to some misunderstandings. 
(2) Comparison with the robot: Subjectivity and selfness, as I have explained, are to be under-
stood as a consequence of the organismic 'principle self-preservation'. Hösle refers to a similar view 
in Hans Jonas (Jonas 1973). Well, I was interested here in further interpreting this connection by 
means of a contrasting comparison with the robot: that the specificity of the organism, its intrinsic 
'care structure' in the sense of the principle self-preservation, essentially owes itself to its natural 
origin and that for it, through the permanent, self-preservation-related valuation of everything it en-
counters, sense – sense of self-preservation – is constituted. 
(3) Self-preservation for robots? But can biotic evolution, Hösle argues, not also be interpreted in 
the way of a (natural or possibly divine) programming of life forms? I myself have already anticipa-
ted this objection in my text (Wandschneider 2018, 253 f): Although selection processes could also 
be regarded as a kind of programming, this would not change anything about the end-in-itself cha-
racter (in Kant's sense) of the organism. Once it is released into its world, it is destined to maintain 
it-self, and that is decisive for its entire own being and existential sense. Hösle further argues that an 
artificial biogenesis, which may be possible in the future, should also be considered in regard that 
robots, too, might be capable of self-preservation. My text, however, expressly refers to "note: ro-
bots in the present form" (253), namely for the purpose of clarifying the sense dementia of today's 
limited techno-beings in comparison with organisms. This does not deny that it might at some futu-
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re point be possible to technically create a 'self-preservation robot' to whom – as I have discussed 
in another work (Wandschneider 2016b) – "should indeed be acknowledged life. It would be a tech-
nical animal, would have subject character, selfness, and perception would have existential sense 
for him" (2016b, Chapter IV.5). But this is science fiction today, and so it is currently only the na-
tural origin of organisms that guarantees the character of life. Hösle's misgivings "when differences 
in essence are tied to genesis" (Hösle replica) should thus be dispelled. However, I also hear the 
more fundamental, not explicitly expressed criticism that logical validity is to be substituted by 
gradual genesis, which, of course, justification-theoretically is not possible. But that is not the point 
here. If the 'natural origin' of the organism is claimed here for the development of selfness and 
sense-relatedness, then it is not the genesis qua genesis that is essential, but the specific type of ge-
nesis (natural selection). 
(4) Mentality in higher animals: If, as in my text, the organism is generally ascribed a reference to 
sense through self-preservation, then a distinction must undoubtedly be made between lower and 
higher animals. Among the latter I would count those that have phenomenal perception (including 
qualia), which empirically certainly already exists 'below' the developmental level of man. To this 
form of perception necessarily belongs also an 'antenna' regarding sense, concerning for example 
attractive and aversive objects or positive and negative sentiences. I would speak here of mental, 
even if not yet conscious, states; which latter I would assume exclusively for forms of human per-
ception (and which I do not explicitly thematize here). All this is empirical and in a certain sense 
hypothetical (I can only speculate, spoken with Ernest Nagel, what it is like to be a bat), but at least 
widely plausible. 
(5) 'Objective' sense without mentality - misunderstanding: Now to the more weighty objecti-
ons: Hösle sees a problem in the objective sense relationship assumed for lower animals. By 'lower' 
animals I mean those that possess a primitive form of perception, but not a phenomenal-mental one. 
Changes in the pH-value of the environment or the light intensity directly trigger reflex reactions in 
them, which are objectively sense-ful (according to the principle self-preservation), but subjectively 
do not constitute a mental dimension. There is a misunderstanding here with Hösle when he writes: 
"Wandschneider's central argument" is that "all living beings must have mentality", because "a self-
preservating system without mentality is logically impossible" (Hösle's replica). I did not say this 
anywhere – and I did not insinuate it either. I have described as quasi 'logically necessary' the care 
structure of the organism that has emerged from the 'selectionist fire' (Wandschneider 2018, 252), 
its character as an end in itself (254), and furthermore that "with self-preservation there is always 
selfness and sense implied" - in the case of lower animals, however, as I said, only an objective 
(self-preservation-)sense, i.e. without a mental grasp of sense: Hösle, although he expressly refers 
to this, see next section (number (6)), obviously did not take this into account. And I've argued that 
the fact that self-preservation always logically implies selfness and sense is independent of how 
self-preservation may be realized in each case (for self-preservation is self-preservation, and that 'in 
all possible worlds') (259). 
(6) Mentality not qua self-preservation, but qua equipment: With the clarification of the misun-
derstanding concerning my opinion, that self-preservation is to logically imply mentality, Hösle's 
zombie argument, which I will briefly repeat, is cancelled out: The fact that I assume self-
preservation for lower animals, but not mentality, means, so Hösle, that "the mental property group 
can be removed from life" without a contradiction resulting from it (Hösle's replica). Mentality-free 
beings, for instance with the physical equipment of the author (or also of his critic) – i.e. zombies –, 
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must thus be accepted as possible without contradiction; as far as Hösle. Now, lower animals are 
denied mentality here exclusively because of their poor physical equipment, because the ability to 
perform mental operations is empirically bound to certain preconditions, e.g. the existence of a 
brain. Thus: not by self-preservation per se mentality is implied, but by a corresponding physical 
equipment. If one remains in this – nomological, i.e. natural law – mode of explanation, then there 
is no reason to simply deny mentality to the mentioned human-like equipped animal individuals, i.e. 
to regard them as zombies. If the zombie argument is nevertheless upheld, then the nomological 
framework of explanation is abandoned, and the question arises: Why? An answer to this question 
will become visible in the next section. 
(7) 'Strong' emergence: Dualism as an advance assumption: A dissent of a fundamental nature 
concerns the concept of emergence and the question of its explanatory value. Hösle refers here to 
Chalmers, who in his main work The Conscious Mind (1996) paid scant attention to the concept of 
emergence and only states in a reference, "that nothing in the story about emergent causation requi-
res us to invoke phenomenal properties anywhere. The entire causal story can be told in terms of 
links between configurations of physical properties" (Chalmers 1996, 379). These are "structure and 
dynamics" (Chalmers 2002, 25). And still in 2003 he states, "that from structure and dynamics, one 
can infer only structure and dynamics" (Chalmers 2003, Ch. 7). In 2006 however, on the occasion 
of his participation in an emergence congress, Chalmers published the article Strong and Weak 
Emergence. The distinction addressed in the title concerns on the one hand 'normal' emergence phe-
nomena ('weak'), according to which the characteristics of a system may be completely new compa-
red to those of its subsystems, but are nevertheless 'deducible' from them - which, on the other hand, 
should no longer apply to the form of a 'strong' emergence. Therewith Chalmers has discovered the 
concept of emergence for himself: "I think there is exactly one clear case of a strongly emergent 
phenomenon, and that is the phenomenon of consciousness". "If these claims are correct, it appears 
to follow that facts about consciousness are not deducible from physical facts alone" (Chalmers 
2006, 246 f). Taking this up, Hösle declares that with regard to consciousness he "assumes a strong 
emergence with Chalmers, that Wandschneider on the other hand must reject" (Hösle replica). Well, 
if the claims Chalmers is talking about are valid, I don't have the option of rejecting them. But they 
refer to Jackson's thought experiment ('Mary') and Chalmers' own zombie argument, both of which 
I criticize in my text. These are intended to support the view that consciousness is the only case of 
strong emergence. So it is not that the concept of strong emergence here provides an explanation for 
the non-deductibility of consciousness, but those thought experiments ('Mary' and 'Zombie'), which 
can be criticized in turn, are conversely intended to support the Chalmers thesis, in other words: In 
the end, this, too,, boils down to the advance presumption of dualism, which I criticized in my text 
with regard to Chalmers. Dualism, it seems to me, here has the value of a fundamental conviction. 
So Hösle formulates: "The laws of the physical do not imply that there is a mental: In my opinion, 
one must agree with Chalmers on this." "Mental and physical phenomena are not identical", and 
"the solution to the question of where the mental appears in nature is simply 'certainly not from the 
physical in it'" (Hösle's replica). These are clear words, and the added 'certainly not' reaffirms Hös-
le's dualistic view, which, it seems to me, is to be understood more as a basic assumption than as a 
result (but see section (11)).      
(8) Supervenience as physicalism-avoidance: But how does the dualist then deal with the overw-
helming empirical evidence of the dependence of consciousness on somatic-neural processes? Here 
the concept of supervenience lends itself. Even if consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical, 
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it is nevertheless somehow connected with it: "Consciousness still supervenes on the physical do-
main" (Chalmers 2006, 247) – also for Hösle a possibility in principle: "Even those who consider 
the mental to be irreducible in relation to the physical, can still take the view that it can only exist 
by supervening on something physical, especially an organism" (Hösle replica). Is this an attempt to 
save dualism without having to negate that empirical evidence – in order to get past physicalism by 
a hair's breadth after all? And this only addresses one of the difficulties with which dualism is con-
fronted. Hösle himself mentions the problem of interactionism, which remains "inscrutable", but, 
"as the example of Leibniz proves, does not necessarily have to occur (Hösle replica), whereby ob-
viously is thought of a form of 'pre-stabilized harmony'. 
(9) Sweeping character of 'the physical': 'The physical': This vocable dominates all literature on 
the body-mind-problem, including that of Chalmers and Hösle. But what is 'the physical'? Accor-
ding to Chalmers (see above) 'structure and dynamics'. On the one hand this is true, but on the other 
hand it is fatally sweeping. What remains hidden, for example, is the fact that the physical can also 
take on configurations that enable it to represent logical facts (in the broadest sense). One need not 
even think of computer systems and programming – even the thermostat of a heating system can 
handle a logical task. This does not mean that it should be considered as thinking. What I am getting 
at is that as a system, it has a specific new ability compared to its parts: a case of what Chalmers 
calls 'weak' emergence, according to which systems can be given wholeness-properties, system 
laws, that their subsystems lack. Properly understood, the whole nature and technology is thus sub-
ject to system laws. Now the brain is essentially a system, so that emergence phenomena can be ex-
pected from the outset. To ignore this, among all, just in the body-mind discussion is to be seen as a 
kind of malpractice. From this point of view, the criticised, undifferentiated talk of 'the physical' gi-
ves cause for thought. The Leibnizian mill-allegory3 mentioned by Hösle also belongs in this con-
text: certainly as a magnificent staging of what is the brain, which admittedly is sweepingly inter-
preted as 'physical'. The fact that one can walk around in it like in a mill without even sighting any 
traces of the mental, illustrates, currently turned around, basically the perspective of the brain re-
searcher who, for methodological reasons, of course, just only can find physical-chemical structures 
and processes. It is this undifferentiated sweeping philosophical understanding of 'the physical' that 
is allegorically manifesting itself here. 
(10) 'Weak-emergentist' dualism: The consideration of emergence phenomena leads to a more 
differentiated concept of the physical. The material-energetic basic constitution of which I would li-
ke to call the merely physical. Functionally relevant is the respective realized system. My text is 
about the highest perception level (of higher animals), i.e. phenomenal perception. The system rele-
vant here is defined by the cooperative of perception, valuation and behavioural actions, which I 
have briefly named as perc-val-act system (described in more detail in Wandschneider 2015 and 
2016a). Emergence is then to be spoken of in the sense that perception does not record individual 
neural spike trains, but rather, in the sense of its control function for behaviour, complex entities, 
'objects', which, through the valuations (genetically predisposed or learned) assigned to them, gain a 
sense character for the percepting subject. I admit that for the time being this has the status of a re-
search project rather than an elaborated theory. What I am fundamentally concerned with here is the 
possibility, opened up by ('weak') emergence, of phenomena which are no longer merely physical, 
yet, because they are anchored in the physical, can nevertheless execute physical effects. Weak 
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emergence thus enables a dualism, as it were, of the 'merely physical' and the 'mentally senseful', 
which is at the same time a monism with regard to the overall physical basis – a kind of emergentist 
squaring of the circle. Could this emergentist dualism possibly suffice for the friends of dualism: at 
least with the philosophically not unattractive option to see the possibility of the mental already in 
the physical, and that means, properly understood, in its ideal laws? This understanding, based on 
the nomological constitution of the physical, is what I would like to call the nomological intuition. 
(11) The axiological intuition: Hösle's dualistic understanding of the body-mind problem is based 
on another intuition, which he explains in more detail in part III of his replica. In the previous secti-
on I had spoken of a dualistic 'basic conviction', which I also see in Chalmers and the unsettledness 
of which I have criticized in my text. Yet Hösle can now put forward an argument for this which he 
characterizes as axiological, i.e. which includes the value aspect and thus allows the body-mind 
problem to be seen in a completely new perspective; I would like to speak briefly of an axiological 
intuition. Essential for the position that Hösle here only briefly sketches is the connection to Leib-
niz. His central principle is the "maximization of the good – to find a sufficient reason for the laws 
that govern our world". In this sense, it applies that "our real world in which we happen to exist is 
not simply one of an infinite number of equally possible worlds, but that this world is real because it 
is axiologically excellent [...] But it is excellent because it is in principle recognizable, namely by 
finite spirit beings who can also understand each other". This understanding is mediated by physical 
signs. That these, however, should be trusted, that they are not mere associations of molecules, but 
reliably refer to the mental, is based on a principle that transcends the physical – the principle that 
ensures "that on its basis mental things can develop": "And therefore there cannot be zombies" 
(Hösle-replica). 
(12) Amusing turn: So not after all! The laws of the physical in our world – which is axiologically 
singled out from other universes – do not allow it. Now, is that not again in the sense of the nomo-
logical intuition? Only in a Leibnizian-extended ontological framework according to the axiological 
intuition? The axiologically conceived ontology is then to be understood as a precondition for a 
possible nomological explanation of mentality. If I see it correctly, we thus have two forms of the 
body-mind problem with quite different focuses: Nomologically, the question arises as to how men-
tality is possible in a physical world – in my view the classical form of the body-mind problem. 
Axiologically, on the other hand, the question arises why we have exactly this physical world of 
ours, in which zombies are not logically but nomologically impossible – a non-standard form of the 
body-mind problem, so to speak, which raises disturbing, highly interesting questions that Hösle 
suggests here: Is nature 'designed' for recognizability and the human mind (the so-called anthropic 
principle)? "Must already the laws of the physical take into account the psycho-physical laws?" 
"Can consciousness be linked only to organisms", or can one assume that "such an [sc. un-physical, 
purely mental] existence exists after death?" (Hösle-Replik): Undoubtedly a substantially different, 
more fundamental form of the body-mind problem than the one I have discussed here.4  Yet  both 
are obviously not incompatible: If the axiological ontology has been worked out to the extent that 
the significance of the nomological in it is clarified – according to Hösle with the result that "a 
transcendental subjectivity that precedes nature has designed nature for finite spirits" (Hösle repli-
ca) – then it can or has to be further questioned in the sense of the classical body-mind problem, 
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and it has to be explained how mentality is concretely realizable, and that means: nomologically 
possible. – Isn't it an amusing turn, certainly not of the history of philosophy, but of this friendly 
dispute, that "the philosophical benefit of zombies" (Hösle-replica) shows itself in the fact that it fi-
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